



Received (in revised form): 11th November 2013
Renato Staub
is a senior risk capital analyst of William Blair’s Dynamic Allocation Strategies team. Before this, he was a senior investment and risk
analyst at UBS Global Asset Management in Chicago and Zurich, where he was responsible for valuation analysis, risk analysis and
risk modeling, and portfolio design of liquid and alternative assets for asset allocation. He started his career in investment
management in 1996 as a quantitative analyst and was involved in the development of various alternative investments. He has
published articles in a variety of professional journals. He received his MS from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich
(ETH), as well as an MA and his PhD from the University of St.Gallen – School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and
International Affairs (HSG) in Switzerland.
Correspondence: Renato Staub, William Blair & Company, 222 West Adams St, Chicago, IL 60606, USA
E-mail: rstaub@williamblair.com
ABSTRACT We develop an asset allocation approach that translates valuation signals into
a suggested allocation. At its core, we simulate a mean-reverting value-price evolution to
infer important distribution parameters as needed in our allocation rule. The latter relies on a
broad range of parameters, thereby diversifying the model risk and making the framework
stable. The simulation is calibrated to meet the risk budget over time. And ﬁnally, a historical
back test looks promising.
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INTRODUCTION
Pension funds face future obligations. In order
to obtain commensurate returns, they invest
in assets. That is, they allocate risk.
Usually, a pension fund, ﬁrst, determines
its long-term asset allocation. Well known as
the ‘policy portfolio’, it comprises the long-
term static mix of the fund’s allocation to risky
asset classes such as equity, bonds, real estate
and others. The mix is supposed to meet the
return target of the fund and is meant to
combine risk and return properties of the
various asset classes in a favorable way.
If the fund remains invested in line with its
long-term strategic asset allocation, it
generates the so-called passive return while
being subjected to passive risk. However, the
fund management may be incentivized to
‘add value to the portfolio’. That is,
depending on the market conditions, it moves
resources from some asset classes to others.
The set of all difference positions between
the effective allocation and the passive
allocation is usually referenced as ‘active
allocation’. It is considered successful, if it
results in a long-term return improvement
without undue increase in portfolio risk.
In this article, we deal with active asset
allocation only. That is, the policy portfolio is
of no interest, although its appropriate
composition is crucial as well. Furthermore,
we conﬁne ourselves to fundamental
valuation. This means that our signals are
based on dividend discount models only.
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These help us decide whether a market is
cheap or expensive. Ultimately, we are in
search of a translation mechanism to convert
valuation signals into an active portfolio.
Although information such as momentum is
certainly valuable as well, it is not considered
part of fundamental investing.
To motivate this, let us consider the
following example. If the US equity market is
considered 10 per cent undervalued and the
UK equity market 15 per cent undervalued,
and if a portfolio manager actively allocates 5
per cent to US equity and 6 per cent to UK
equity, how does he come up with these
numbers? Of course, he has qualitative reasons
embedded in a more or less appropriate gut
feeling. However, again, why not 5 per cent
and 7.5 per cent, or why not 5 per cent each?
In the absence of a clear answer, we feel
compelled to provide the missing link. We are
in search of a formal mechanism to translate
the valuation signals into a suggested active
portfolio. We want a clear rationale as to why
a miss-valuation of X per cent results in an
active allocation of Y per cent. In addition,
we want the translation to be ‘objective’ in
that it is reproducible under identical
circumstances, and we want our framework
to be consistent across capabilities.
Furthermore, we calibrate the amount of risk
to be taken in line with the given opportunity
to meet the risk budget over time.
In contrast to a risk parity approach, we do
not assign equal shares of portfolio risk to the
various asset classes. Rather, their risk
contributions are supposed to be
commensurate with the embedded
opportunities. These vary considerably over
time. If two asset classes contribute identical
amounts of risk to the portfolio, this is for
reasons of coincidence.
Our game plan is the following. First, we
simulate the evolutions of the individual
markets’ value-price (vp) discrepancies over
time.1 At each point of time, we then infer
the suggested allocation corresponding to the
vp dispersions in place. Finally, we investigate
the properties of the implemented portfolio.
That is, given the vp signals, we are looking
for the amount of active risk to be taken and the
composition of the active strategy. A pivotal
parameter to be identiﬁed is the scaling factor. It
determines how strongly the signals must be
levered into active positions such that the
portfolio meets the risk budget over time.
Our examination covers various areas of
expertise, such as valuation-based models,
random walk modeling, implementation of
mean reversion and information analysis.
Ultimately, we integrate all of them into a
single framework.
Our approach is rooted in 2006, and we
have continuously enhanced it. Over the past
four and a half years, it has been at the core of
our portfolios. Two years ago, we started to
implement it jointly with the New Zealand
Superannuation fund for their strategic tilting
program. That is, the approach is not a black
box. It can rather be adjusted for individual
organizations in terms of their asset universe
and their own view.
The core idea of this approach and the
corresponding experience in the context of
the New Zealand Superannuation fund have
been published most recently.2 Although that
publication portrays the approach from a
high-level perspective and is centered around
the ‘what’, the objective of this article is to
focus on its technical foundation, that is, it
explains the ‘how’.
CENTRAL TENDENCY
A market that follows a perfect random walk
does not – by deﬁnition – comprise information
at all. Owing to its entirely random evolution
there is no way to predict it. Although the
academic point of view is that markets are
efﬁcient and hence cannot be predicted, many
practitioners think that they can be predicted in
the long run, at least partially.
Indeed, many years of collected data
suggest that markets become disconnected at
times from their fundamentals, disconnected
on the upside and the downside. Markets go
through boom and bust. By deﬁnition, the
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existence of extremes on both ends imply
reversion toward the mean and beyond at
times.
The contribution of this year’s Nobel Prize
winners in economics ﬁts well into this
discussion. Let us quote the corresponding
press release from the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences: 3
There is no way to predict whether the
price of stocks and bonds will go up or
down over the next few days or weeks. But
it is quite possible to foresee the broad
course of the prices of these assets over
longer time periods, such as, the next three
to ﬁve years.
That is, noise dominates drift in the short
run, whereas drift dominates noise in the long
run. This cannot apply to a pure random
walk, as it has no drift. However, it applies to
a mean-reverting evolution, as mean
reversion is one form of drift. It is variable
drift. Consistently, long-term investors tend
to outperform short-term investors in the
long run.
Although mean reversion cannot be
proven formally, there is strong empirical
evidence. To that end, let us consider the
evolution of the S&P 500 price index,
adjusted by the US consumer price index,
over the past 20 years.
Figure 1 reveals various inﬂection points,
the ﬁrst one being the peak of the dot-com
bubble in 2000, when optimism seemed
unconstrained. During the subsequent
sobering mode, the market plunged to half its
level. Starting in 2003, it turned into a
protracted uptrend, supported by cheap
money. In fall 2008, the credit crisis peaked
with the default of Lehman Brothers, and the
market dived again to half its previous level.
Ultimately, at the draught of spring 2009, the
trend turned positive, interrupted repeatedly
by the various stages of the European debt
crisis and the US budget crisis.
On the basis of our assessment, the
inﬂection points have been in the territory of
both overvaluation and undervaluation,
sometimes even considerably. However, what
is ultimately responsible for such deﬂections?
The point is that during periods of
missvaluation, a market’s expected and
subsequently generated cash ﬂow tend to
differ, sometimes positively, sometimes
negatively and sometimes markedly. If the
cash ﬂow turns out smaller (larger) than
expected, this results in disappointment
(goodwill), and the price that buyers are
willing to pay decreases (increases). This
correction mechanism forces the market price
back toward intrinsic value.
A similar mechanism works in currency
markets. At some point, a nation’s
consumption basket may become so cheap if
measured in a foreign currency that it makes











Figure 1: S&P 500 price index – CPI adjusted (08/1993=100).
Source: Datastream.
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factoring in transaction costs. In such an
environment, there is an increasing demand
for the cheap currency, which makes it more
expensive again. That is, the exchange rate is
pulled back toward a more sustainable
relationship.
SIMULATION MODEL
In the ﬁrst step, we simulate the vp evolution.
Note that the simulation is not about
predicting the future. Rather, it is about
determining calibration parameters that we
need in subsequent stages.
In essence, we deal with two key inputs, a
market’s price, P, and its fundamental value,
V. Although P can be observed in the market,
V is a concept and must be estimated. Various
market participants may have different
perceptions of V.
Going forward, we simulate4 the evolution
of the logarithmic values of V and P, that is,
v and p. Furthermore, we need a covariance
matrix as the key source of information
behind the random shocks. However,
documenting the construction of a covariance
matrix goes beyond the scope of this article.
Even more so, as this has been documented in
a publication of its own.5
We simulate on the basis of our long-term
forward-looking covariance matrix
(equilibrium matrix), which is not in line with
the recent history.6 The reason to use it
nonetheless is our intention to provide a
long-term examination, supposed to cover
one or several entire cycles.7
The debate of a forward-looking versus a
historical matrix in asset allocation is almost as
old as asset allocation itself. Ultimately, the
point is that we deal with future performance,
and hence the relevant risks are future risks.
Of course, risk expectations can be wrong as
much as return expectations. In the end,
accuracy in terms of both risk and return
makes up skill.
Last but not least, a user can decide to use a
short-term historical matrix in any case. May
be because he faces a very short horizon or
may be for another reason.
Next, to account for central tendency, we
build mean reversion into the simulation. A
mean-reverting market simulated in its easiest
form looks as follows:
pt + 1 ¼ pt ð1 - βppÞ + εt + 1
where βpp is the mean reversion coefﬁcient of
price8 and εt+1 is a random shock. If βpp equals
zero, the process is a perfect random walk. If it
differs from zero but its absolute value is
smaller than 1, the market is mean reverting.
The closer to 1, the stronger the mean
reversion is.
Figure 2 shows a 1000-year vp simulation
of US equity on a monthly basis. The
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Figure 2: vp simulation of US equity on the basis of various mean reversion coefﬁcients.
Source: proprietary.
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and the mean reversion coefﬁcients of the
3 functions are 0.00, 0.01 and 0.02.
As revealed by Figure 2, we widen the
dispersion by decreasing the mean-reversion
coefﬁcient. Ultimately, in case of a zero mean
reversion coefﬁcient, the band is inﬁnitely
wide, as it represents a perfect random walk.
In case of a mean reversion coefﬁcient of
0.01, the smallest and the largest value equal
−0.75 and 0.73, corresponding to a price that
equals 211 per cent and 48 per cent of the
intrinsic value, which we consider realistic.9
However, again, the decision maker of
another organization may decide otherwise.
He is free to do it, as much as he has to take
responsibility for it.
Finally, the most deviated curve in Figure 2
shows an evolution in the absence of mean
reversion. As no force pulls to the center, the
vp dispersion increases with the length of the
horizon. In the simulated case, we achieve the
largest vp, that is, 4.71, after approximately
450 years, corresponding to a price that equals
0.90 per cent of the intrinsic value.10 This is
far from credible.
Without a doubt, as compared with the
shocks, mean reversion is a minor
instantaneous force. However, aggregated
over time, it turns out to be a pivotal driver.11
In the end, mean reversion is the force
ensuring that vp does not defuse but stays
within limits. Their breadth can be calibrated
and is a key decision.
As aforementioned, it is crucial to calibrate
a simulation such that the resulting
distribution properties of vp are consistent
with evidence. Notably, the span between the
extremes on the upside and the downside is
relevant. If we claimed that an equity market
simulation provided extremes of 10 per cent
and −10 per cent, this would be in contrast
with evidence.
Although calibrating extremes is subjective
and hence a challenge, we have empirical
experience from the past 40 years, including
bubble experience. Furthermore, given a
simulation span as long as 1000 years,
considerable extremes should not surprise.
Table 1 shows the simulated vp dispersions
of the markets that constitute the universe of
this article. Note that the ultimate simulation
is somewhat more complex than explained
previously. It is documented in the appendix,
where the calibration is provided as well.12
The table has to be read as follows. In the
two extreme cases, the price of the US equity
Table 1: Calibration of vp simulations
Return(%) Risk(%) P/V(minimum %) P/V(1%) P/V(50%) P/V(99%) P/V(maximum %)
EQ US 7.9 15.5 33 48 101 204 248
EQ UK 7.6 15.9 37 50 100 202 332
EQ EMU 8.1 17.8 35 47 101 201 308
EQ SWI 7.4 16.6 40 53 101 182 261
EQ JAP 8.8 20.2 30 45 100 219 356
EQ AUS 8.2 16.9 44 57 99 199 288
EQ CAN 7.6 17.2 44 54 100 200 281
EQ EMA 7.9 19.2 23 38 101 257 466
BD 10Y US 5.9 7.5 72 79 100 128 150
BD 10Y UK 6.0 8.0 73 79 100 128 143
BD 10Y EMU 5.9 7.4 73 81 100 124 140
BD 10Y CH 5.7 6.4 74 83 100 122 132
BD 10Y JAP 5.8 7.1 73 79 100 121 130
BD 10Y AUS 6.0 8.7 67 78 100 132 151
BD 10Y CAN 5.9 8.3 73 80 100 130 150
BD 5Y US 5.4 4.6 81 87 100 116 127
BD 2Y US 5.0 2.4 89 93 100 108 112
HY US 5.9 7.6 64 74 100 133 158
BD EM 5.9 8.3 64 72 101 134 158
RB 10Y US 5.3 5.2 79 85 100 116 125
Source: proprietary.
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market equals 33 per cent (undervalued) and
248 per cent (overvalued), respectively, of its
fundamental value.
As extremes are, by nature, subject to
large error margins, they are not overly stable.
Hence, the 1 per cent and 99 per cent
percentile are more appropriate candidates for
comparison.
Although the resulting vp spans of equity
markets are larger than for other asset classes
because of equity markets’ highest risk, they
are also the largest in relative terms (that is,
span versus risk). The reason is that we
perceive a stronger central tendency for bonds
than for equity. Consequently, we calibrate
bond markets with a stronger mean reversion.
As a reference, we considered the price of
the US equity market approximately 160 per
cent of its intrinsic value at the peak of the
internet bubble in 2000,13 and about 50 per
cent of its intrinsic value at the worst time of
the ﬁnancial market crisis in 2008.14
EMBEDDED INFORMATION
A mean-reverting time series, s, contains
information. Mean reversion and embedded
information are two sides of the same coin. As
mean reversion is a balancing force, the
subsequent change in s is more likely to be
negative (positive) if s is positive (negative).15
In order to identify the information
embedded in s, we calculate the
 Expected extra return16 from reversion
during the next time step;17
 Subsequently materialized extra return
during the next time step.
The correlation between the two is a
measure for the information embedded in the
process. Namely, the higher the correlation,
the more accurate our expectation was. The
correlation is referenced as ‘information
coefﬁcient’ (IC). The bigger the IC, the
bigger the information embedded in our vp
simulation is.
We decide to model mean reversion as a
linear force.18 There is always a chance that a
simulated time series moves even further out
in the short run, no matter how much off-
balance it already is. This is consistent with
empirical evidence.
In contrast, if we decided to establish a
variable mean-reversion coefﬁcient that
approaches 1 with an increasing
missvaluation, this would imply that the time
series could only move in one direction once
having moved out far enough. In other
words, it could only move back, that is, it
would be deterministic.
If mean reversion is modeled as a linear
force, two functions with different volatilities
but identical reversion parameters have
identical shapes, as one function is simply a
constant multiple of the other one.
Moreover, as a constant scaling factor does
not add statistical information, the two




The Proportional Allocation Rule (PAR) is
one of our key tools.19 It requires to always
allocate proportionally to our signal in order to
be the most efﬁcient. A prerequisite of PAR is
that multiple signals should have the same
volatility. Hence, we should standardize
them. However, while uncorrelated signals
are another prerequisite, this will, of course,
not be achieved perfectly. However, the way
we construct the portfolio, the correlation
effect will be ﬁltered out largely.
In the following – brief and schematic –
example, let us assume that the market price
moves up by Δ in a ﬁrst step and back down
by Δ in a second step (Table 2).
At time 0, the price equals p and the
value v. We buy an amount of (v−p). Next,
between time 0 and 1, the price has changed
by Δ. As a result, vp has changed to (v−p−Δ),
that is, the discrepancy has widened. To be
consistent with PAR, this requires us to adjust
the quantity. In order to keep proportionality
Value-based asset allocation
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between discrepancy and quantity, we adjust
the quantity by −Δ; we do this
instantaneously, that is, at time 1′.20 And
ﬁnally, between time 1 and 2, the price has
changed by −Δ. This leaves us with the
quantity (v−p−Δ) at price p. The costs for
buying/selling leaves us with a net gain of
Δ2over a time span of two time units.
The key to this net gain is the fact that we
have a smaller exposure from price p to p+Δ
(when we make a loss) than back from price
p+Δ to p (when we make a gain). This
example could easily be expanded to four
time steps, and we would generate a gain
twice as big. Furthermore, it makes no
difference in which order the price




 and so on
lead to the same PAR performance.
However, the prerequisite is a round trip, as
this is what mean reversion is about. Next, we
can make the time steps inﬁnitely short and
integrate the net gain over some horizon. The
resulting total net gain is a linear function of
the duration. That is, given a constant
volatility and implementing PAR, the extra
return is proportional to the time lapsed. The
size of the vp extremes is not relevant.
If a market is cheap (expensive) and mean
reverting, it is a ‘statistical tautology’ that it
will outperform (underperform) in the long
run. Hence, a ‘proof’ on the basis of a mean-




xr ¼ v - pð Þ=d
is supposed to represent the expected annual
extra return because of reversion to fair value
over the conversion horizon, d. Hence, the
difference between two markets’ extra return
equals
Δxrij ¼ xri - xrj
This, however, is a naïve difference to be
expected in case of perfect information.
However, as this is not the case, the naïve
expectation must be corrected by the quality
of information, that is, by the embedded joint
IC, and hence
E Δxrij
  ¼ xri - xrj
   ICij
This is the return that we can expect if we
go long asset i and short asset j. The price for
taking this tilt is the risk associated with this
position, that is, the relative risk between asset
i and asset j, σij. That is, the units of expected
return per unit of relative risk21 equal
srij ¼ xri - xrj
   ICij

σij
We use this as our raw signal. Next,
assume the following two cases. In both
cases, the units of return per unit of relative
risk are identical, that is, both cases are
subject to the same efﬁciency and hence the
same raw signal, which would suggest the
same US$ allocation. However, assume that
in the ﬁrst case, i and j are bond markets,
whereas in the second case, they are equity
markets. That is, in the ﬁrst case, this would
imply a much smaller risk contribution.
Hence, in order to correct this, our raw signal
has to be scaled a second time by the risk
distance, and we get
sij ¼ xri - xrj
   ICij
.
σ2ij
This, ultimately, is our working signal.
And again, according to PAR, we allocate
Table 2: Schematic PAR example
Time Price Quantity Cost
0 p (v−p) −pv+p2
1 p+Δ — —
1′ p+Δ −Δ pΔ+Δ2
2 p (v−p−Δ) pv−p2−pΔ
Net gain — — Δ2
Source: proprietary.
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proportionally to it, that is
wij ¼ f  xri - xrj
   ICij
.
σ2ij
where f is a proportionality factor that scales to
the desired level of risk. If f is doubled, the
resulting portfolio risk is doubled as well.22
The objective of the vp simulation is to
identify f such that the resulting risk budget is
met ex post.




independent mutual bets. In case of 21




or 210 different bets. Table 3 shows all
mutually relative tilts at some randomly
selected point.
In this example, we go, among others,
long US equity versus Canadian equity by
0.55 per cent, and in addition we go short
Canadian equity versus US equity by another
0.55 per cent. In aggregate this means that we
go long US equity versus Canadian equity by
1.1 per cent. Although this may sound
complicated, it is easier to set up such a ‘two-
way street’ algorithm, as we can tackle things
symmetrically. Finally, the shadowed column
on the right-hand end comprises the row
aggregates. For instance, we would go long
4.80 per cent US equity.
With reference to its matrix structure, we
call the approach ‘matrix approach’.
Consequently, cash is treated like all other
buckets, and the resulting cash dispersion will
be on the same order of magnitude as for all
other buckets. This would not be the case, if
all tilts were made versus cash only. In such a
case, cash would literally be the ultimate
‘shock absorber’, and its allocation dispersion
would be of a bigger magnitude than for all
other buckets. In the end, tilting all markets
versus cash only would result more or less in a
single asset–cash bet.
Although nothing would prevent us from
tilting versus cash only, the matrix approach
results in a higher efﬁciency as it better
diversiﬁes the model risk and parameter risks
throughout the entire investment universe.
Moreover, as it contains all mutual tilts
between equity markets, bond markets and
cash, the asset–cash decision and the asset
allocation decision are already embedded.
RISK BUDGET
Figure 3 shows the simulated vp of US equity.
The further away the curve is from fair value,
that is, from 0 per cent, the bigger the
allocation to the corresponding bucket tends
to be. If all markets were at fair value, there
would be no reason to allocate actively.
Again, we do not run a risk parity
approach, as we do not assign equal shares to
risk.23 Rather, risk goes with opportunity,
and the active risk and its composition vary
over time, commensurate with the
opportunity.
Note that the vp evolutions have nothing
to do with the scaling factor f, whose role is to
determine how much the active portfolio
must be levered to meet the risk budget over
time.
In the given simulation, we identify the
following scaling factor
f ¼ 0:00222
It ensures that the active portfolio’s risk
budget of 5 per cent is met over time
throughout our simulation. If we doubled the
risk budget, we would have to double f as well.
Figure 4 shows the corresponding
forward-looking active risk, calculated on the
basis of the suggested active portfolio over
time. Over a simulation span of 100 years, it
varies between 2 per cent and 10 per cent,
suggesting considerable opportunity swings.
How do we come up with a scaling factor
of 0.00222? By trial-and-error. A bigger
(smaller) scaling factor results in an
overshooting (undershooting) of the risk
budget. Typically, the scaling factor is
identiﬁed after 3–4 iterations.
Value-based asset allocation
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Equity US — 0.13 −0.53 0.36 −0.07 0.29 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.45 0.27
Equity UK −0.13 — −0.59 0.23 −0.11 0.16 0.33 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.13
Equity EMU 0.53 0.59 — 0.64 0.27 0.67 0.86 0.53 0.46 0.60 0.51
Equity SWI −0.36 −0.23 −0.64 — −0.27 −0.07 0.10 0.04 −0.12 0.05 −0.09
Equity JAP 0.07 0.11 −0.27 0.27 — 0.19 0.35 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.18
Equity AUS −0.29 −0.16 −0.67 0.07 −0.19 — 0.19 0.10 −0.04 0.13 −0.01
Equity CAN −0.55 −0.33 −0.86 −0.10 −0.35 −0.19 — −0.02 −0.18 −0.04 −0.18
Equity EMA −0.30 −0.22 −0.53 −0.04 −0.24 −0.10 0.02 — −0.11 −0.01 −0.09
Treasuries US 10Y −0.21 −0.10 −0.46 0.12 −0.14 0.04 0.18 0.11 — 3.22 0.48
Treasuries UK 10Y −0.45 −0.30 −0.60 −0.05 −0.27 −0.13 0.04 0.01 −3.22 — −3.55
Treasuries EMU 10Y −0.27 −0.13 −0.51 0.09 −0.18 0.01 0.18 0.09 −0.48 3.55 —
Treasuries CH 10Y −0.35 −0.23 −0.57 0.00 −0.22 −0.08 0.08 0.03 −1.69 0.80 −2.77
Treasuries JAP 10Y −0.30 −0.19 −0.51 0.03 −0.21 −0.05 0.10 0.05 −0.98 0.75 −0.65
Treasuries AUS 10Y −0.26 −0.14 −0.53 0.09 −0.18 0.01 0.17 0.08 −0.62 1.88 −0.04
Treasuries CAN 10Y −0.22 −0.09 −0.44 0.12 −0.15 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.19 2.54 0.52
Treasuries US 5Y −0.30 −0.19 −0.47 0.02 −0.21 −0.05 0.10 0.04 −3.10 1.06 −1.21
Treasuries US 2Y −0.37 −0.26 −0.51 −0.05 −0.22 −0.12 0.03 0.00 −1.66 −0.07 −1.48
High Yield Bonds US −0.30 −0.15 −0.55 0.10 −0.18 0.01 0.18 0.10 −0.49 1.37 −0.01
EM Bonds 0.00 0.08 −0.35 0.29 −0.05 0.24 0.39 0.22 1.88 2.70 1.60
Treasuries US 10Y (Real) −0.38 −0.26 −0.54 −0.04 −0.23 −0.12 0.04 0.01 −2.82 0.06 −1.43















































Equity US 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.30 0.00 0.38 0.38 4.80
Equity UK 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.26 0.15 −0.08 0.26 0.28 2.35\
Equity EMU 0.57 0.51 0.53 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.35 0.54 0.50 10.64
Equity SWI 0.00 −0.03 −0.09 −0.12 −0.02 0.05 −0.10 −0.29 0.04 0.08 −2.06
Equity JAP 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.26 3.47
Equity AUS 0.08 0.05 −0.01 −0.05 0.05 0.12 −0.01 −0.24 0.12 0.14 −0.63
Equity CAN −0.08 −0.10 −0.17 −0.22 −0.10 −0.03 −0.18 −0.39 −0.04 0.00 −4.12
Equity EMA −0.03 −0.05 −0.08 −0.11 −0.04 0.00 −0.10 −0.22 −0.01 0.02 −2.23
Treasuries US 10Y 1.69 0.98 0.62 −0.19 3.10 1.66 0.49 −1.88 2.82 1.58 14.11
Treasuries UK 10Y −0.80 −0.75 −1.88 −2.54 −1.06 0.07 −1.37 −2.70 −0.06 0.26 −19.37
Treasuries EMU 10Y 2.77 0.65 0.04 −0.52 1.21 1.48 0.01 −1.60 1.43 1.33 9.15
Treasuries CH 10Y — −0.36 −0.98 −1.45 −0.39 0.79 −0.96 −2.39 0.56 0.92 −9.25
Treasuries JAP 10Y 0.36 — −0.59 −0.81 0.18 0.96 −0.50 −1.86 0.79 1.05 −2.38
Treasuries AUS 10Y 0.98 0.59 — −0.53 0.90 0.98 −0.01 −1.48 1.21 0.96 4.04
Treasuries CAN 10Y 1.45 0.81 0.53 — 1.86 1.43 0.39 −1.33 1.85 1.28 11.13
Treasuries US 5Y 0.39 −0.18 −0.90 −1.86 — 3.18 −1.24 −3.42 2.34 2.66 −3.36
Treasuries US 2Y −0.79 −0.96 −0.98 −1.43 −3.18 — −1.71 −3.25 −0.34 5.99 −11.36
High Yield Bonds US 0.96 0.50 0.01 −0.39 1.24 1.71 — −1.66 1.55 1.59 5.61
EM Bonds 2.39 1.86 1.48 1.33 3.42 3.25 1.66 — 3.13 2.93 28.45
Treasuries US 10Y (Real) −0.56 −0.79 −1.21 −1.85 −2.34 0.34 −1.55 −3.13 — 0.75 −16.04





























Table 4 assembles the simulation results for
cash, US equity and our active portfolio,
referenced as ‘Base Case’.
Again, the primary objective of the
simulation is a risk allocation that meets the
budget over time. Once having identiﬁed f
we can set the suggested allocation over time.
Although listed in Table 4, the resulting
active return is less crucial. Of course, if
negative, the simulation program would
comprise an error. However, as mentioned
in the previous section, simulating a portfolio
on the basis of mean-reverting markets
must result in outperformance. Ultimately,
the relevance is the appropriate allocation
of risk.
Of course, targeting the resulting active risk
may be just one possible objective. For
instance, we could put conditions on the total
portfolio risk or on the relative amount of
instances in which the total or relative risk
exceed some hurdle. Furthermore, we might
decide to apply allocation bounds, or we could
require that the bounds became binding in no
more than a certain amount of instances.
ROBUSTNESS
Our model is based on many mutual ICs.
Although the absolute size of the ICs is
irrelevant, as the portfolio is scaled by f, their
relative size has an impact. In our Base Case,
the largest mutual IC equals four times the
size of the smallest IC.
In the following case, Case A, we make all
ICs the same across the universe.24 They
equal the average size of the ICs in the Base
Case, but the scaling factor is left unchanged.
Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the forward-
looking active risks of Case A versus the Base














Figure 4: Forward-looking active risk based on the active portfolio over time.
Source: proprietary.
Table 4: Simulation results
Aggregate Return (%) Risk (%)
Cash 4.7 0.5
US equity 7.9 15.5

























Figure 3: Simulated vp of US equity over 100 years.
Source: proprietary.
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The risks turn out much in line. In fact,
they have a correlation of 0.95. As a result of
our IC adjustment, equity–equity bets are
increased, bond–bond bets are decreased and
equity–bond bets are just marginally affected.
However, as some individual IC scales a
particular mutual tilt but never ﬂips its sign,
the tilt will never point into the opposite
direction after an IC rescaling. Ultimately, the
aggregate impact turns out to be very
moderate.
Another important topic is the average
stock–bond correlation. We think that,
fundamentally, it should be positive, and this
is what we have modeled into the long-term
matrix. By contrast, we have observed a
negative correlation over the past few years.
Hence, in the next case, Case B, we simulate a
universe that comprises correlations between
national equity and bond markets that strictly
equal −0.20.
The Figure 6 is a scatter plot of all active
risks of Case B versus the Base Case over 100
years.
The scatter reveals a smaller similarity as
compared with Case A, but a correlation at
0.72 is still quite high. As a result of the
ﬂipped stock–bond correlations, the risk
distances between equity markets and bond
markets have increased. In contrast to Case A,
the equity–bond bets are more than just
































Figure 6: Scatter plot of all active risks of Case B versus the Base Case.
Source: proprietary.
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Table 5 summarizes the results of the various
simulations.
In a ﬁnal examination, we infer the
suggested allocation at some particular point
of time under the Base Case, and in a second
calculation we replace the risk distances of the
Base Case by the risk distances of Case B, that
is, we use negative stock–bond correlations
and hence bigger stock–bond risk distances.
The two resulting allocations and the
difference between them are provided in the
Table 6.
Although the differences between
individual buckets are not overwhelming,
their aggregated impact is more perceptible in
that there is a shift of 3.03 per cent from
equity to ﬁxed income. On the basis of the
valuation signals, most mutual stock–bond
tilts tend to be long equity and short bonds.
However, as a result of the bigger risk distance
between equity and bonds, the tilt to equity is
reduced somewhat.
To conclude this section, we note that a
big amount of parameters determines the
entire system. It is not rooted in any single
parameter driving it fairly much on its own.
Rather, all parameters are involved to a
similar degree. This, in turn, makes the system
quite stable.
And second, we do not optimize.
Optimization makes a system behave erratic at
times. Moreover, correspondingly, it is a
challenge at times to get the rationale behind
a suggested allocation. This comes from the
fact that the optimizer ‘squeezes’ the last basis
point of return out of the system, at
whatsoever cost. Hence, we often observe in
an optimizing context that parameters ﬂip all
of a sudden, even after minor data changes.
We do not have to expect this kind of sign
ﬂipping in our context. Moreover,
consistently, the translation of adjusted
parameters into a portfolio can usually be
followed in a straightforward manner. It
meets common intuition.
To sum up this section, the primary
objective of the simulation is a risk allocation
that meets the budget over time. Once having
identiﬁed f we can set the actual suggested
allocation as based on our valuation.
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
At the end of August 2009, we started to
build suggested allocations. However, for
various reasons, a historical back testing is less
straight than a forward-looking simulation.
First, new economic insights must be worked
into the long-term forward-looking
covariance matrix. Hence, we face occasional
amendments of the matrix in production.
Second, broader aggregates such as European
Monetary Union (EMU) equities and
Emerging Markets (EM) equities have been
disaggregated. In addition, as the US sectors
are sufﬁciently large to value them
individually, it made sense at some point to










Case A 5.5 5.1 0.95
Case B 6.6 6.1 0.72
Source: proprietary.







Equity US 4.80 3.65 −1.16
Equity UK 2.35 1.79 −0.57
Equity EMU 10.64 8.77 −1.87
Equity SWI −2.06 −1.79 0.26
Equity JAP 3.47 2.90 −0.56
Equity AUS −0.63 −0.63 0.01
Equity CAN −4.12 −3.53 0.59
Equity EMA −2.23 −1.97 0.26
Treasuries US 10Y 14.11 14.28 0.17
Treasuries UK 10Y −19.37 −18.74 0.63
Treasuries EMU 10Y 9.15 9.41 0.26
Treasuries CH 10Y −9.25 −8.86 0.39
Treasuries JAP 10Y −2.38 −2.05 0.33
Treasuries AUS 10Y 4.04 4.32 0.28
Treasuries CAN 10Y 11.13 11.27 0.14
Treasuries US 5Y −3.36 −3.10 0.26
Treasuries US 2Y −11.36 −11.16 0.20
High yield bonds US 5.61 5.95 0.35




Cash US −22.96 −22.92 0.04
Source: proprietary.
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break up US equity into its sectors. And third,
every once in a while, new markets are added
to the universe. The Table 7 shows the
universe as grown over time.
Figure 7 presents the resulting
performance index over 4 years. The annual
return of 16.5 per cent goes in line with an
ex post volatility of 22.5 per cent, resulting in
an information ratio of 0.74. Again, as most
markets have been mean reverting, this
positive result is not a surprise by itself.
However, this is not the end of the discussion
yet. First, it is important to understand that
strictly implementing a fundamental approach
does not imply – by deﬁnition – that
performance will be smooth. If most equity
markets are undervalued, this will result
mainly in equity long positions. However, it
is possible that equity prices fall even further.
Market participants may become temporarily
risk averse for a multitude of possible reasons.
Consequently, they discount markets by
bigger risk premia.
This means that the opportunity becomes
even bigger. Hence, in this environment, it is
paramount to stick with PAR. The third year
of our back test, which looks dissatisfactory,
falls into this category. The European debt
crisis and the US budget crisis were mainly
responsible for this drop, but at the same time
they created further opportunity. From our
point of view, the Spanish and Italian equity
markets, for instance, are still massively
undervalued.
Finally, the resulting historical portfolio
volatility turns out about twice as high as
targeted in the long run. On the other hand, it
is important to acknowledge that the past few
years were a time of big opportunity, and our
approach takes risk commensurate with
opportunity. On the other hand, we will not
waste the risk budget, if we spot no
opportunity. Hence, inferring from probably
less than half a cycle to the entire cycle is
Table 7: Our universe as grown over time
Universe
Equity Australia Equity India
Equity Canada Equity Indonesia
Equity France Equity Korea
Equity Germany Equity Malaysia
Equity Hong Kong Equity Mexico
Equity Italy Equity Russia
Equity Japan Equity South Africa
Equity The Netherlands Equity Taiwan
Equity Singapore Treasury bonds 10Y Australia
Equity Spain Treasury bonds 10Y Canada
Equity Sweden Treasury Bonds 10Y
Switzerland
Equity Switzerlnd Treasury bonds 10Y Germany
Equity UK Treasury bonds 10Y Spain
Equity US Treasury bonds 10Y Ireland
Energy US Treasury bonds 10Y Italy
Materials US Treasury bonds 10Y Portugal
Industrials US Treasury bonds 10Y Greece
Consumer discretionary US Treasury bonds 10Y Japan
Consumer staples US Treasury bonds 10Y US
Financials US Treasury bonds 10Y UK
Health care US Treasury bonds 10Y US (ILG)
Information Technology US High yield bonds US
Telecom services US Treasury bonds EM (USD)
Utilities US Corporate bonds US
Equity Brazil Mortgage backed securities US









Figure 7: Performance index of the model back testing.
Source: proprietary.
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inappropriate. The full cycle will entail
protracted periods of sub-par opportunity and
hence we will take much less risk.
ACTUAL ALLOCATION
Table 8 shows the suggested allocation, given
the calibration as inferred throughout this
article and our valuation as of late. Although
ﬁxed income is considered overvalued almost
across the board, there are both undervalued
and overvalued equity markets.
This results in a relative risk of 6.9 per cent,
which is larger than its long-term target of
5 per cent. Given the massive overvaluation of
most ﬁxed income markets, combined with a
very strong undervaluation of UK equity and
EMU equity, this outcome makes sense.
The given allocation reveals a characteristic
feature of the matrix approach. Namely, an
undervalued (overvalued) market may result –
nonetheless – in a negative (positive)
allocation. The reason is that a market may be
considered undervalued (overvalued) but to a
lesser degree than many other markets.
The table contains various examples for this.
Although Australian 10Y bonds are
considered overvalued, our suggested
allocation to them is, nonetheless, positive.
The point is that there are several other ﬁxed
income markets that are considered
substantially more overvalued. This may lead
to multiple mutual tilts in which Australian
bonds take a long position, which may result
in a positive aggregate Australian bond




Our primary objective is a risk allocation that
meets the budget over time. To that end, we
develop an asset allocation approach that
translates valuation signals into a suggested
allocation. The approach is supposed to be
transparent and consistent across markets.
At its core, we simulate a mean-reverting
vp evolution. A simulation is a straight way to
infer necessary distribution parameters, which
will be used when it comes to setting the
allocation as based on the present valuation.
In a subsequent step, we extract the signals
from the simulated vp evolution and infer all
mutual tilts possible between any two
markets. We set a mutual tilt on the basis of
the difference between the two involved
extra returns. An extra return is a market’s
expected compensation above or below its
fair compensation.
As a result of the matrix structure of these
tilts, we call the approach ‘matrix approach’.
Not only does it perform better than an
approach that makes all tilts versus cash only,
but the resulting cash allocation is more stable
as well. Ultimately, cash is treated like any
other bucket.
The matrix approach performs well, as it
better diversiﬁes the model risk and parameter
risks throughout the entire system. In the end,
many parameters determine the entire system.
The approach is not rooted in any single






Equity US 103 1.13
Equity UK 70 11.57
Equity EMU 66 10.17
Equity SWI 105 0.66
Equity JAP 101 0.87
Equity AUS 89 4.54
Equity CAN 98 1.94
Equity EMA 84 3.40
Treasuries US 10Y 119 −20.12
Treasuries UK 10Y 120 −18.18
Treasuries EMU 10Y 120 −20.10
Treasuries CH 10Y 119 −17.71
Treasuries JAP 10Y 125 −28.15
Treasuries AUS 10Y 112 3.45
Treasuries CAN 10Y 123 −26.87
Treasuries US 5Y 110 9.46
Treasuries US 2Y 104 12.84
High yield bonds US 100 32.32




Cash US 101 33.27
Source: proprietary.
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parameter, driving it fairly much on its own.
This makes our framework quite stable.
In addition, because it establishes all
mutual bets between equity markets, bond
markets and cash, the asset–cash decision and
the asset allocation decision are embedded
already.
Last but not least, a historical back test of
the approach looks promising, although it
covers less than probably half a cycle at this
time.
NOTES
1. V and P are measured as regular numeraires. That is, their
minimum value equals zero, and their maximum is
unlimited. The ‘true’ intrinsic value is deﬁned as 1.
Furthermore, the lower case labels, v and p, deﬁne the
logarithmic values of V and P.
2. See Iverson and Staub (2013).
3. See Jarnestad (2013); Fama (1970 and 1991); Campbell and
Shiller (2007) and Shiller (2000).
4. This process is documented more formally in Appendix A.
5. See Staub (2006).
6. The matrix is provided in Appendix C.
7. For our own production, we have developed a framework
that is based on volatile risk parameters. That is, risks and
correlations vary. We calibrate them such that their average
size over a full cycle is in line with our long-term estimates.
Again, this approach goes way beyond the scope of an
introduction.
8. As we will show in the appendix, we may think as well of a
mean reversion versus another series.
9. vp≡ v−p= log(V/P); v−p=V/P= exp(−0.75) and
V/P= 0.4724 or P=V/0.4724=V−2.1170.
10. vp≡ v−p= log(V/P)= 4.71; V/P= exp(4.71); P=V/
111.05.
11. As the aggregation of mean reversion works, unlike
random shocks, repeatedly in the same direction.
12. See Appendix A.
13. Note, while the technology sector was overvalued
massively, the overvaluation of the US equity market
without technology was less extreme.
14. This was our assessment when we were at UBS Global
Asset Management.
15. s is considered in log space.
16. The extra return is the difference between the expected
compensation and the fair compensation.
17. In order to calculate the expected extra return, we must
assume a reversion time. However, the reversion time does
not impact the subsequent correlation calculation, as long
as it is constant.
18. More clearly, a linear force in log space, as we model
everything in log space.
19. See Staub (2007, p. 369f ).
20. Time 1 and 1′ are meant to be two subsequent points of
time that are inﬁnitely close.
21. It is the same concept as the Sharpe Ratio.
22. This, however, only applies to an unconstrained portfolio.
If a portfolio is constrained and already has a high risk, it is
increasingly impossible to double its risk.
23. See Callan Associates (2010, p. 11).
24. This is a typical suggestion from practitioners, as they want
nothing ‘magic’ behind the IC dispersion.
25. That is, v is not an ‘objective value’; rather, it is our
perception.
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APPENDIX A:
Appendix A: vp Modeling
In the ﬁrst step assume that the price follows a
random walk. That is
pt + 1 ¼ pt + εt + 1
where εt+1 is a random shock. Typically, pt+1
contains a series of markets. Hence, εt+1 is not
a scalar but a vector of random shocks. These
are speciﬁed in the covariance matrix.
Furthermore, as a perfect random walk
defuses, we must ensure mean reversion.
Hence, we adjust the above equation as
Value-based asset allocation
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follows
pt + 1 ¼ pt 1 - βpp
 
+ εt + 1
where βpp is the of mean reversion of the





marks the transition from a non-stationary to
a stationary process.With regard to v, the
point is that nobody knows it, and this is why
we must estimate it. In our model, we assume
that our estimate of the intrinsic value
ﬂuctuates around the ‘true’ intrinsic value that
nobody knows. Hence,
vt + 1 ¼ vt 1 - βvvð Þ + ηt + 1
where βvv is the mean reversion of the value.
25
Furthermore, there is evidence that models are
reviewed more often in case of large vp
discrepancies. That is, we tend to question the
model rather than staying course. Such behavior
applies in particular to those markets in which we
have low model conﬁdence, and the corres-
ponding reviews typically narrow the discrepancy.
Technically, this means that there is a gap
sensitivity of the assumed v versus p, that is,
the perceived value mean reverts around price
as well. Such behavior is not necessarily
surprising, as it happens in case of strong
momentum, that is, most participants think
that the price is justiﬁed. We refer to this
phenomenon as ‘chasing’; the value chases the
price. Algebraically, this means
vt + 1 ¼ vt 1 - βvvð Þ + vt - ptð Þ 1 - βvp
 
+ ηt + 1
or
vt + 1 ¼ vt 2 - βvv - βvp
 
- pt 1 - βvp
 
+ ηt + 1
where βvp is the gap sensitivity of mean
reversion of value versus price. Owing to
chasing, the average opportunity becomes
 More of a perception than reality
 Smaller
Ultimately, after subtracting price from value,
we get
vpt + 1 ¼ vt 2 - βvv - βvp
 
- pt 2 - βpp - βvp
 
+ ηt + 1 - εt + 1
Setting the ﬁnal calibration, we generally
assume less uncertainty in valuations of more
developed markets. Without a doubt, the
S&P 500 is more examined than the
Indonesian equity market, which is part of
EM equity in the Table A1. Consequently,
we assume less uncertainty in the valuation of
the S&P 500.
Furthermore, we assume stronger mean
reversion for developed markets and more
mean reversion for ﬁxed income than for
equity. And ﬁnally, chasing tends to be
stronger for less investigated markets. In such
cases, there is a bigger tendency to conﬁrm
the market price by the valuation model. As a
result, the opportunity tends to be perceived
smaller than the real opportunity.
Although Table A1 shows the calibration
underlying our vp simulation, we need to
acknowledge that calibration elements cannot
be ‘proven’ on the basis of theoretical
considerations. Setting them is largely a






EQ US 15.3 3.8 0.005 0.005
EQ UK 15.9 4.0 0.005 0.005
EQ EMU 17.6 4.4 0.005 0.010
EQ SWI 16.7 4.2 0.005 0.010
EQ JAP 20.0 5.0 0.005 0.010
EQ AUS 16.7 4.2 0.005 0.010
EQ CAN 17.0 4.3 0.005 0.010
EQ EMA 19.1 9.5 0.003 0.010
BD 10Y US 7.4 1.8 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y UK 8.0 2.0 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y EMU 7.4 1.8 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y CH 6.4 1.6 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y JAP 7.1 1.8 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y AUS 8.6 2.2 0.020 0.005
BD 10Y CAN 8.2 2.1 0.020 0.005
BD 5Y US 4.6 1.1 0.020 0.005
BD 2Y US 2.3 0.6 0.020 0.005
HY US 7.5 3.7 0.010 0.010
BD EM 8.1 4.0 0.010 0.010
RB 10Y US 5.1 1.3 0.020 0.005
SB US 0.4 0.1 0.080 0.010
Source: proprietary.
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question of common sense, and this involves
much backward calibration.
APPENDIX B:
Appendix B: PAR – Numerical
example
As PAR is a central element of our approach,
it is worthwhile to present the way it
functions more visually. As its name expresses,
it is the idea of PAR to persistently allocate
proportionally to the signal.
Figure B1 shows the easiest representation
of PAR. Assume a fairly priced market.
Consequently, we have no active position.
The market moves one unit away from fair
value; in our case it becomes cheaper, that is,
it is now underpriced by one unit.
Accordingly, we buy one unit. In a second
step, the market gets more expensive again by
one unit. That is, it moves back to fair value.
Now, we could sell our unit at a higher price
than we bought it. Overall, we are better off
by one unit than before.
Again, the trick of PAR is that the market
moves ﬁrst and we adjust thereafter. This
example can easily be expanded to four time
steps. Then we would generate a gain twice as
big. The only prerequisite is a round trip,
which is another characterization of mean
reversion.
Figure B2 introduces a ‘triangle sine’
function. Initially, there is a growing vp
discrepancy that peaks at the ﬁrst quarter of
the cycle, then it decreases, and after the
draught at three quarters of the cycle, it moves
back to the starting value.
Table B1 shows all the numbers along the
20 corresponding time steps, in particular the
resulting allocation and gains and losses at
every time step, if we strictly apply PAR.
The net gain over a full cycle turns out to
equal 10 units. The pattern of the gains and
losses at each point of time is presented in
Figure B3.
The point of this exercise is to demonstrate
that gains exceed the losses slightly but
systematically. This is revealed by considering
carefully the length of the bars.
A standard question is how PAR performs,
if the ‘true’ intrinsic value differs from our
perception. Hence, we assume in a second
example that we underestimate the intrinsic
value persistently by two units (see Figure B4
and B5)
In this case, the perceived vps determine
the allocation. Moreover, Table B2 shows all
the numbers.
VP = 0 
VP ≠ 0
Tilt = 0 Tilt ≠ 0









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
vp
Time
Figure B2: vp evolution with ‘triangle sine’ shape.
Source: proprietary.
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Interestingly, the net gain over a full
cycle turns out unchanged, that is, 10 units
again.
However, the pattern of the individual
gains and losses is quite different from the
pattern evidenced in the previous example.
Overall, they have a wider dispersion,
resulting in a smaller information ratio. In the
ﬁrst example, the information ratio equals
0.78, while it is 0.64 in the second.
To sum up, being off systematically in
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Figure B5: Gains and losses commensurate with Figure B4.
Source: proprietary.
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It just makes the result less efﬁcient. Again,
the indispensable prerequisite is mean
reversion. However, the impact of mean
reversion is not pivotally affected by not
‘hitting’ the intrinsic value exactly.
Table B2: Numbers commensurate with Figure B4
Time ‘True’ vp Perceived vp Pos Δ(VP) Gain
1 0 −2 −2 1 2
2 1 −1 −1 1 1
3 2 0 0 1 0
4 3 1 1 1 −1
5 4 2 2 1 −2
6 5 3 3 −1 3
7 4 2 2 −1 2
8 3 1 1 −1 1
9 2 0 0 −1 0
10 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
11 0 −2 −2 −1 −2
12 −1 −3 −3 −1 −3
13 −2 −4 −4 −1 −4
14 −3 −5 −5 −1 −5
15 −4 −6 −6 −1 −6
16 −5 −7 −7 1 7
17 −4 −6 −6 1 6
18 −3 −5 −5 1 5
19 −2 −4 −4 1 4
20 −1 −3 −3 1 3
Total 10 — — — —
Note: Pos, Position.
Source: proprietary.
Table B1: Numbers commensurate with Figure B2
Time vp Pos Δ(VP) Gain
1 0 0 1 0
2 1 1 1 −1
3 2 2 1 −2
4 3 3 1 −3
5 4 4 1 −4
6 5 5 −1 5
7 4 4 −1 4
8 3 3 −1 3
9 2 2 −1 2
10 1 1 −1 1
11 0 0 −1 0
12 −1 −1 −1 −1
13 −2 −2 −1 −2
14 −3 −3 −1 −3
15 −4 −4 −1 −4
16 −5 −5 1 5
17 −4 −4 1 4
18 −3 −3 1 3
19 −2 −2 1 2
20 −1 −1 1 1
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Table C1: Input covariance matrix
EQ US 15.3% 1.00 0.72 0.77 0.69 0.67 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.52 0.46 0.23 0.31
EQ UK 15.9% 0.72 1.00 0.68 0.60 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.61 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.17 0.24
EQ EMU 17.6% 0.77 0.68 1.00 0.64 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.65 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.46 0.41 0.18 0.26
EQ SWI 16.7% 0.69 0.60 0.64 1.00 0.56 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.41 0.36 0.16 0.23
EQ JAP 20.0% 0.67 0.58 0.62 0.56 1.00 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.40 0.35 0.15 0.22
EQ AUS 16.7% 0.73 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.59 1.00 0.67 0.62 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.39 0.17 0.25
EQ CAN 17.0% 0.74 0.66 0.70 0.61 0.59 0.67 1.00 0.63 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.39 0.17 0.25
EQ EMA 19.1% 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.63 1.00 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.41 0.36 0.16 0.23
BD 10Y US 7.4% 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29 1.00 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.66 0.85 0.90 0.99 0.93 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.76
BD 10Y UK 8.0% 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.82 1.00 0.87 0.77 0.62 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.61 0.53 0.62 0.65
BD 10Y EMU 7.4% 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.77 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.59 0.51 0.57 0.61
BD 10Y CH 6.4% 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.71 0.77 0.87 1.00 0.60 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.54 0.47 0.52 0.56
BD 10Y JAP 7.1% 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.60 1.00 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.52
BD 10Y AUS 8.6% 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.26 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.72 0.68 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.81 0.62 0.54 0.64 0.67
BD 10Y CAN 8.2% 0.36 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.36 0.27 0.90 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.61 0.80 1.00 0.89 0.85 0.65 0.57 0.68 0.70
BD 5Y US 4.6% 0.40 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.99 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.85 0.89 1.00 0.97 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.83
BD 2Y US 2.3% 0.38 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.93 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.62 0.81 0.85 0.97 1.00 0.68 0.60 0.72 0.94
HY US 7.5% 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.68 1.00 0.53 0.52 0.57
BD EM 8.1% 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.54 0.57 0.63 0.60 0.53 1.00 0.46 0.50
RB 10Y US 5.1% 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.76 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.48 0.64 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.52 0.46 1.00 0.60



























Table D1: Mutual information coefﬁcients
EQ US 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
EQ UK 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
EQ EMU 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
EQ SWI 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
EQ JAP 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
EQ AUS 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08
EQ CAN 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
EQ EMA 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
BD 10Y US 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.13
BD 10Y UK 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13
BD 10Y EMU 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.13
BD 10Y CH 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.13
BD 10Y JAP 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14
BD 10Y AUS 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13
BD 10Y CAN 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13
BD 5Y US 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15
BD 2Y US 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.24
HY US 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.16
BD EM 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.17
RB 10Y US 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.13
SB US 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.00
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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